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Abstract
Abstraction is a fundamental part when learning behavioral models of systems. Usually
the process of abstraction is manually defined by domain experts. This paper presents a
method to perform automatic abstraction for network protocols. In particular a weakly
supervised clustering algorithm is used to build an abstraction with a small vocabulary size
for the widely used TLS protocol. To show the effectiveness of the proposed method we
compare the resultant abstract messages to a manually constructed (reference) abstraction.
With a small amount of side-information in the form of a few labeled examples this method
finds an abstraction that matches the reference abstraction perfectly.
Keywords: abstraction learning, automata learning, learning-based testing
1. Introduction
The implementation of complex designs is challenging even for experts. This complexity
often leads to bugs in the implementation. Therefore, complex pieces of software or hard-
ware are usually extensive tested and/or verified. This, however, is complicated by the
fact that most designs are not formally specified, if at all. Due to this model-based testing
with learned models has become rather popular in the recent past (e.g., de Ruiter and Poll
(2015)).
However, the methods used in the field of learning-based testing – namely a family
of algorithms all building upon L* (Angluin, 1987) – rely on small alphabets in order to
work in practice. For instance, Smeenk et al. (2015) make use of detailed knowledge of the
system under test to limit the size of the alphabet in order to make it feasible to apply L*.
This reduction of the alphabet size is brought about by defining some abstraction which is
typically done by hand. This process, however, relies on a considerable degree of knowledge
of the system under test that is not necessarily available.
In this paper we set forth to perform abstraction of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol with as little human intervention as possible. To this end, we employ a weakly su-
pervised learning algorithm from the k-means family that takes only a few labeled examples
as input. It uses this kind of side-information to build a set of constraints of which data
points need to be assigned to the same cluster and which must not. These constraints are
then in turn used to both guide the algorithm towards both an optimal cluster assignment
and learning a distance metric with which the clusters can be optimally separated. We
evaluate this semi-automatic method by comparing the cluster assignments to a reference
abstraction. This reference abstraction is of the form as a human would have to provide one
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when using common methods. With a small amount of side-information in the form of a few
labeled examples this method finds an abstraction identical to the reference abstraction.
The choice to perform automatic abstraction of TLS is the direct consequence of critical
position TLS takes up in modern internet-based communication. On top of this semi-
automatic abstraction one can learn automata that can be used in model-based testing – a
practice known as learning-based testing.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the semi-supervised clus-
tering algorithm. In Section 3 we discuss the experimental setup, the data used and the
evaluation procedures employed. Section 3.3 reports results obtained from the experiments
and discusses their implications for the task of (semi-)automatic abstraction. We conclude
with a general discussion in Section 5.
2. Method: MPCK-means
Metric learning and pairwise-constrained k-means (MPCK-means) clustering (Bilenko et al.,
2004) is an approach to semi-supervised learning which employs pairwise constraints. Pair-
wise constraints come in two forms: must-link constraints and cannot-link constraints.
MPCK-means employs these pairwise constraints for both learning a metric space which
separates data points of cannot-link pairs and brings data points of must-link pairs closer
together as well as avoids constraint violations when assigning data points to clusters.
MPCK-means employs the following objective function in (1). It minimizes cluster
dispersion under the learned metric and at the same time reduces constraint violations:
Jmpckm =
∑
xi∈X
(d(xi,µli)
2
Ali
)− log(det(Ali))
+
∑
(xi,xj)∈M
wfM(xi,xj)1[li 6= lj ]
+
∑
(xi,xj)∈C
w¯fC(xi,xj)1[li = lj ], (1)
where X is the set of data points, l is the cluster assignment of the current data point,
d(·, ·)Ali is the current metric for this particular cluster, that is a weight matrix, w and w¯
are the penalties imposed on violations of must-link constraints and cannot-link constraints,
respectively, M and C are the sets of must-link constraints and cannot-link constraints,
respectively, fM and fC are functions defining the penalty imposed violations depending on
the closeness of the involved data points under the current metric and 1 is the indicator
function.
The first term of objective (Eq. 1) accounts for the dispersion given the current metrics
Al (one for each cluster). The second term is needed as normalization of the magnitude of
the weights in Al. The third and forth term measures the number of violated constraints
weighted by a hyper-parameter (wij and w¯ij , respectively) and the distance between the
two involved data points. Therefore, violated must-link constraints which are considered to
be far away under the current metrics Ali and Alj result in larger penalties:
2
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fM(xi,xj) =
1
2
d(xi,xj)
2
Ali
+
1
2
d(xi,xj)
2
Alj
(2)
Similarly, violated cannot-link constraints which are considered to be close together
under the current metric Ali result in larger penalties:
fC(xi,xj) = d(x′li ,x
′′
lj
)2 − d(xi,xj)2Ali (3)
where (x′li ,x
′′
li
) are the two maximally separated data points according to the current metric
Ali . This ensures that fC(xi,xj) is non-negative.
For the experiments we use – in contrast to the MPCK-mean’s original formulation – a
weighted hamming distance for d(·, ·)Ali . Therefore, the weighting matrix Ali is diagonal.
In this sense employing a diagonal weighting matrix corresponds to feature weighting.
3. Experiments
All experiments presented in this text are implemented with the R programming language
(R Core Team, 2018) and use TLS traces gathered with the logging component of nqsb-tls
(Kaloper-Mersˇinjak et al., 2015), a modern TLS implementation. In total, the data consists
of approximately 53k decoded TLS traces comprising nearly 370k messages. There are just
over 81k unique messages. In this work, we used a random sub-set of 5k messages where
each message is truncated to a maximum of 32 fields (uninformative fields RANDOM and
SESSIONID are filtered). A sample TLS message is given in Table 1.
HANDSHAKE-IN CLIENTHELLO
VERSION TLS 1 2
CIPHERSUITES TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 . . .
...
Table 1: A sample TLS message (decoded and truncated).
3.1. The TLS protocol
One of today’s most widely used cryptographic security protocol is Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS), predecessors of which are also known as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). It is used
to secure communications over insecure channels in applications as diverse web browsing
(as HTTPS), email (as SMTPS), voice-over-IP (in SIP) and virtual private networks (in
OpenVPN). For a long time, TLS implementations had been considered very secure Open-
VPN. A number of high-profile vulnerabilities starting in 2014 have changed this picture,
most famously a security bug called Heartbleed. Most TLS implementations provide a wide
array of TLS versions, protocol extensions, authentication modes and key exchange modes
in order to be maximally compatible with clients.
For this text’s endeavor the interesting part of TLS is the process of establishing a secure
connection between two nodes. In this process three sub-protocols are in use: To establish
3
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session parameters and cryptographic keys the Handshake protocol is used. Authentication,
if asked for, is also done by means of this sub-protocol. To start the session with the keys
established via the handshake sub-protocol the ChangeCipherSpec sub-protocol is used. To
signal errors or warnings to the other node the Alert sub-protocol is used.
3.2. Evaluation Measure
In order to evaluate the quality of the automatic abstraction we manually construct a
reference abstraction which is generated by a set of hand-written rules. This reference
abstraction consists of J = 21 classes and is similar to the abstraction found in the literature
(cf. for instance Beurdouche et al. (2015) or de Ruiter and Poll (2015)).
To measure the mismatch between the automatic abstraction and the reference abstrac-
tion we employ two common measures for clustering performance, namely, purity and the
adjusted Rand index (ARI).
For determining Purity each cluster of the automatic abstraction is assigned to the
reference abstraction where the intersection of samples is maximal. The number of inter-
secting samples is accumulated over all clusters and normalized (Manning et al., 2008). It
is formally defined as
purity(Ω,C) =
1
N
∑
k
max
j
|ωk ∩ cj |,
where N is number of samples, Ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωK} is the set of clusters provided by the
algorithm, C = {c1, c2, ..., CJ} is the set of classes of the reference abstraction, ωk denotes
the set of samples in cluster k and cj is the set of samples of the reference abstraction in
class j. Purity is thus closely related to accuracy and a good indicator of goodness for
practical applications.
We also measure quality of abstraction through the ARI (Hubert and Arabie, 1985), a
measure for similarity between two partitioning that is adjusted for chance. The ARI equals
0 if the clustering equals the expected value, and 1 for a perfect clustering. Moreover, the
ARI is geared more towards a fair evaluation of methods than purity.
3.3. Results and Discussion
In the present experiments we envision a scenario where constructing a manual abstraction
is considerably more costly than having a domain expert deciding on whether two TLS
messages should be considered equal or unequal for the task at hand.
The confusion matrix of the classical k -means algorithm (unsupervised) is shown in
Figure 1(a). It achieves a purity of 0.69 and an ARI of 0.48. In this experiment K is
set equal to J = 21. Figure 1(b) shows the results for the MPCK-means using K = J .
Additionally MPCK-means uses 5 labeled samples per class, i.e. in total 105 labels samples
are used. Note that from these samples the must-link and cannot-link constraints can be
formed. In this setting, we obtain an abstraction that matches the reference abstraction
perfectly.
In Figure 2(a) we show results for MPCK-means by varying K ∈ {20, . . . , 40}. The
best ARI is obtained for K = 22. In this experiment only one labeled sample per class is
used. Hence, only cannot-link constraints can be formed. In Figure 2(b) we show results
for MPCK-means by varying the number of labels per class from 1 to 5. The best ARI is
4
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Confusion matrix: (a) Confusion matrix for baseline (unsupervised k -means).
69% purity, 48% ARI. (b) Confusion matrix for MPCK-means; 5 labeled samples
per class are used for the must-link and the cannot-link constraints; 100% purity,
100% ARI. Dark spots in the main diagonal correspond to small cluster sizes, not
errors.
obtained for 5 labels. In this experiment K equals J . We achieve an ARI of 1 when using
5 labeled samples per class. In this case the cluster assignment of MPCK means matches
the reference abstraction.
4. Related work
Whalen et al. (2010) learn hidden Markov models of the message format of text-based
network protocols (HTTP, FTP).Cui et al. (2007) apply recursive clustering and merging
to learn the format of both text-based and binary network protocols (HTTP, RPC, SMB).
Some research in this field assume additionally access to the software binary in order to
perform dynamic binary analysis, i.e. analyze the interaction between the executing system
and the executed software (Caballero et al., 2007; Wondracek et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009;
Milani Comparetti et al., 2009). This condition is not met in the scenario envisioned in this
paper where we only assume access to the system under test over the network.
In a different line of research, (Aarts et al., 2012) integrate the task of finding valid
abstractions into the loop of learning a finite state machine of the system under test.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the semi-automatic abstraction of the network protocol TLS.
In particular, we use a small amount of side-information in the form of a few labeled exam-
ples. This enables to find an abstraction that matches the reference abstraction perfectly.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: MPCK-means: (a) Variation of number of clusters K; 1 labeled sample per class
is used for the cannot-link constraints; no must-link constraints can be formed.
(b) Variation of number of labels per class (top: balanced, bottom: unbalanced).
In future work, we aim to use our automatic abstraction to feed an automaton learning
algorithm to show its usefulness in frameworks currently in use in model-based testing.
Furthermore, we plan to use MPCK-means for other protocols beyond TLS.
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